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Agreeing to Disagree

The Annals of Statistics · 1976 · Vol. 4(6)

Robert J. Aumann✉(Hebrew University of Jerusalem)

Abstract

Two people, 1 and 2, are said to have common knowledge of an event $E$ if both know it, 1 knows that 2 knows it, 2 knows that 1 knows is, 1 knows that 2 knows that 1 knows it, and so on. THEOREM. If two people have the same priors, and their posteriors for an event $A$ are common knowledge, then these posteriors are equal.

Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Economic Theory and Institutions Game Theory and ApplicationsEvent (particle physics)Common knowledge (logic)Prior probabilityComputer scienceMathematicsMathematical economicsCalculus (dental)Discrete mathematicsTheoretical computer scienceStatistics

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The interdisciplinary study of coordination