articleTop 1% cited
Corruption
The Quarterly Journal of Economics · 1993 · Vol. 108(3) · pp. 599–617
Andrei Shleifer✉(Harvard University Press)Robert W. Vishny(University of Chicago)
Abstract
This paper presents two propositions about corruption. First, the structure of government institutions and of the political process are very important determinants of the level of corruption. In particular, weak governments that do not control their agencies experience very high corruption levels. Second, the illegality of corruption and the need for secrecy make it much more distortionary and costly than its sister activity, taxation. These results may explain why, in some less developed countries, corruption is so high and so costly to development.
Corruption and Economic DevelopmentLanguage changeLibrary sciencePolitical scienceManagementSociologyArtComputer scienceEconomics
Citations
3,701
FWCI
32.54
field-weighted impact
References
0
Percentile
100%
vs. same field & year
Citations per year
Cited by
Transforming disadvantages into advantages: developing-country MNEs in the least developed countries
Journal of International Business Studies · 2008 · 1,331 citations
Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions
The Quarterly Journal of Economics · 1997 · 5,665 citations
Political uncertainty and risk premia
Journal of Financial Economics · 2013 · 2,189 citations
Is Transparency the Key to Reducing Corruption in Resource-Rich Countries?
World Development · 2008 · 758 citations
Politically Connected Firms
American Economic Review · 2006 · 3,911 citations
Eight Questions about Corruption
The Journal of Economic Perspectives · 2005 · 1,693 citations
Who cares about corruption?
Journal of International Business Studies · 2006 · 811 citations
A Survey of Corporate Governance
The Journal of Finance · 1997 · 16,068 citations
Citation Network
How this paper connects to the literature. Drag to explore, click any node to open that paper.
